A blogger growing in both reputation and influence, Steve Schippert presents in ThreatsWatch a current assessment of Iraq thats worth considering closely. Schippert is a retired Marine. Says Schippert:

An otherwise sadly commonplace story in New York Times actually illustrates well the current situation in Iraq. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is still capable of executing deadly bombings, but the terrorists are unable to coordinate, incapable of regularly and securely communicating, and wholly incapable of taking control of entire Iraqi towns and villages as it once did. While news of a bombing is difficult to fathom as ‘good news,’ the greater context is clearly and overwhelmingly positive beyond the immediate human destruction wrought – now nearly haphazardly though not randomly – by bloodthirsty terrorists.

Schippert has been a fearce critique of politicians who have sought to mischaracterize the The Iraq Awakening for political purposes. He offers here the best analysis written thus far:

Debate circulates in American political circles essentially whether it was American troops who aided the Iraq Awakening or whether it was the Iraq Awakening who assisted the American troops. This debate is really quite silly and, for some, appears even self-serving. The fact of the matter is that the flower of victory required both like the sun and the rain.

The al-Qaeda weed is now a withered vine, driven from edge to edge by a population no longer at their mercy and no longer afraid to stand up. They were finally confident that American and Iraqi forces arrived to stay, to protect them. To enable them.

Schippert leaves with a frank picture of “The Surge” and puts it in its proper place:

Was it ‘The Surge’? If you think of ‘The Surge’ as a troop count, then no. But if you think of ‘The Surge’ as a conscious decision to change strategies and leave our bases and protect entire swaths of the Iraqi population from al-Qaeda, and thereby giving them the confidence – and armed support – necessary to fight back for their streets, neighborhoods, towns and cities, then yes. It was ‘The Surge.’

If we properly apply the lessons learned in Iraq and account for cultural and other unique differences, the same basic human factors that caused the Iraqis to feel confident enough to rise up and defeat a terrorist insurgency campaign are the same basic human factors which will ultimately defeat terrorists in other insurgencies elsewhere. Like, say, Afghanistan.

Schippert’s closing statement about Afghanistan is telling and might be a window to the future. General Richard Petraus, architect of the Iraqi surge now commands the entire theatre.

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